| From: | "Paul J. Adam" <plotd@********.DEMON.CO.UK> |
|---|---|
| Subject: | Re: Another Dead Judge |
| Date: | Wed, 5 Aug 1998 01:24:01 +0100 |
Jameson <erikj@****.COM> writes
>At 10:26 PM 8/4/98 +0100, you wrote:
>>Of course, it then needs to maintain that image.
>
>Yes. And they learned the lesson that you get more with honey than salt.
Bingo. The one certainty is that open warfare is _expensive_ for all
participants, whether in lost profits or lost votes.
>>There's a case to be made (not decisive, but it's not out of the
>>question) that Ares sees close linkage with the UCAS as a long-term
>>survival advantage: perhaps, over time, making Ares/UCAS equivalent to
>>Aztechnology/Aztlan.
>
>Going to be even more difficult to do once Villiers new corp gets' going.
So the sooner they start, the better...
>>Or, better yet, the Japan-United States axis: Japan makes many of the
>>subcomponents and wields considerable economic power, but is grossly
>>outmatched militarily and is entirely dependent on US military hardware
>>(though Mitsubishi produce tanks and fighters and warships, they are
>>licenced US designs or very close derivatives thereof).
>
>This actually would probably be a much better example. There's a reason
>why people in DC are concerned about the Japanese economy, because it has
>already started to affect ours. If we think globalization has intertangled
>things today, then just wait until some corporations are nations unto
>themselves.
Again, bingo. Why did the United States leap to defend Saudi Arabia and
liberate Kuwait in 1990/1? Why did Britain back you up with an armoured
brigade and a big chunk of naval and air forces? Because expensive oil
might benefit a few Texans and some British oil companies, but it costs
both our economies dear overall, as our export markets have to spend
more of their money importing that oil instead of buying our goods and
services.
If you want a usable if not perfect fictional example, a UCAS-versus-
megacorp war would resemble the fight seen in Tom Clancy's "Debt of
Honour" between the US and a Japan misled by a handful of well-placed
militants.
>>>But what the hell are we supposed to judge upon then?
>>
>>Reality, Erik?
>
>Agreed. But again, we all know that SR doesn't model combat realistically.
> It's an abstraction, and one that people have been futzing over since day
>one.
True - but that's a game mechanic.
>And I'll repeat it again, FASA's
>writers are generally closer to my level of knowledge than yours. Now, Jon
>Setzo is former military and seems to know a heck of a lot more, but he's
>pretty new to the game also. I'm pretty sure his first SR book was Rigger
>2.
Jon's got a very good feel for the hardware and the "softer" issues. I
don't agree with him 100% (be boring if I did), but he's a great asset
for FASA and brings some much-needed expertise in the field.
>>>Likely force levels - about 400,000 active duty, made up of 150,000
>>>Navy, 50,000 Marine Corps, 200,000 Army and 100,000 Air Force.
>>Total force. A _long_ way down from today, but still formidable. There
>>would IMO be sizeable reserve forces, mostly land troops (Army/Marine
>>Reserve and Metroplex Guard) taking the total well past a million in
>>full mobilisation, but that would impose serious economic problems if
>>sustained.
>
>So how many front-line combatants would that mean?
Navy - probably six CVBGs, six amphib groups, two dozen fast-attack
subs, six to eight SSBNs, about eighty destroyers and frigates, plus
support fleet.
Note that this presumes the "SmartShip" initiative works, allowing the
sort of crew sizes discussed for the DD-21 (the last of which are
probably still in the UCAS and CAS navy...) where a crew of 75-100 man a
ship that previously needed 350.
Air Force - don't have such a strong feel there, but figure on about 400
front-line fighters (in the F-22/ F/A-18E / EF2000 class of multirole
combatants), 30-40 heavy bombers (I've created the Sabre for ShadowTK,
basically a stealthier B-1B that actually works - not that it's appeared
much). Figure 40 heavy-lift (C-5/C-17) and ~100 medium-lift transports,
plus another ~60 airframes like the KC-135/KC-10 that are primarily
tankers but can act as transports in a pinch. A lot more airlift is tied
up in Reserve forces, as are numbers of older fighter aircraft in
Metroplex Guard units (call it another ~100 C-130Js or similar and ~150
Reserve fighters, second-line but still dangerous).
Army - four Regular divisions, able to put about 50,000 men in the
field, and about 20,000 infantrymen, three thousand APCs and a thousand
tanks on the frontline with devastating fire support (about 800 SP
artillery pieces and 400 towed 155mm guns, plus specialist heavier
weapons) and uninterrupted logistics (those 'extra' bodies are clearing
mines, reinforcing bridges, fixing vehicles, or moving fuel, ammo, food
and spares up and casualties back).
A month into the crisis that doubles as Reserve units are deployed,
equipped and trained to similar standards as the regulars (usually
because many of them _were_ regulars and the remainder compete to beat
the ARABs - Arrogant Regular Army Bastards)
Three months in that number quadruples as you bring in the Metroplex and
National Guard units, generally less well trained and equipped but still
dangerous and capable forces. That allows for leaving some Guard units
behind in case they're needed at home.
Marines - six MEUs deployed, in port or in readiness, each a balanced
battalion sized force comparable to Rusanov's Rebels with newer
equipment and a bigger training budget. Those come from three nominal
"Marine Divisions", which are probably down to brigade strength (three
or four battalions each) to give a USMC combatant strength of about
5,000 troops supported by 150-200 tanks if you put them all in one
place.
Basically, something less than a third of the current force structure,
with the axe falling heaviest on the Air Force (especially its strategic
mission) and lightest on the Navy, Marine Corps and the Army Reserve.
All MHO, of course.
>>Talk to the politicians, not to their footsoldiers, if you want to
>>change policy. Ranting at the troops... is just grandstanding. Achieves
>>nothing except to alienate and annoy them.
>
>Ack, I hate this. I'm normally on your side in this arguement, it's not
>familiar territory at all from this side of things. I will rest and say
>that it is NOT the role of the the soldier to simply "do or die" and while
>many a soldier clings to that credo, I reject it utterly.
Oh, you're not an automaton. The Laws of Armed Conflict _are_ taught to
soldiers, even to reservists like me: including the fact that "I was
only obeying orders" is _not_ a valid defence before a war-crimes
tribunal.
I'd recommend John Keegan's "The Face of Battle", particularly the
chapter "Killing No Murder?" where he examines the bounds of the
soldier's right to use violence, if you're interested.
>It is not always
>the politicians fault; the military could have found another way to carry
>out an order. It's not always the militaries fault either.
Classic case - mid-1960s Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were deeply
dissatisfied with Lyndon Johnson's chosen courses of action, yet
acquiesced and co-operated with him.
Should they have resigned, citing "inability to carry out policies we
consider misguided"? Or should they have saluted and obeyed their
Commander-in-Chief? After all, he was elected, and they were not.
No quick or easy answers.
>>Clausewitz' analysis of warfare is useful, but as idealised as his
>>contemporary Marx's examination of economics.
>
>True, his concepts aren't terribly applicable to real warfare, but he is
>still quite useful, much as Sun Tzu. And since I tend to argue based more
>on general concepts and theory, he's very useful to me.
He's got some useful ideas, but you need to keep the limitations of his
work in mind.
>>Actually (perhaps I misread it) you presented as advocating corporate
>>dominance.
>
>I think I did move heavily to that side as a reaction to your (apparent)
>extremity advocating federal dominance.
Don't mistake Mitchell's opinions for mine :) He _is_ a zealot.
I do feel that corporate power is overplayed compared to national might
- but if one side had a clear advantage, they would surely have _used
it_ by now?
The balance, the interplay, the manoevering on the fringes... that's
what Shadowrun, to me, is about, and having major nations and megacorps
balanced against each other offers more opportunities to explore.
>>Perhaps FASA intend to move towards a bipolar world? Certainly human
>>nature is happier when it has a bad guy to demonise.
>
>Not likely. Consider the eventual outcome of the Blood in the Boardroom
>plot. The Japanacorps lose one of their own to Russia, their Hong Kong
>arch-enemy finally gains power, and Ares now has two other megas to compete
>with in North America. If anything, they've spread the power around so
>that the economy is even more interwoven.
>
>That does still leave the Azzies and SK to demonize.
Aztlan, in particular, strikes me as a concern. Has _nobody_ noticed the
odd magical behaviour going on in there? I'd hazard that realistically,
even if megacorps were choosing not to notice, the NAN and CAS would be
excreting chunks of masonry at having to share a border with such
strangeness.
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam paul@********.demon.co.uk
