| From: | The Powerhouse <P.C.Steele@*********.AC.UK> |
|---|---|
| Subject: | Dangers of potable phones: Pt I |
| Date: | Mon, 21 Mar 1994 17:03:56 +0000 |
use of portable phones and how easy it is to detect the location of a
subscriber. I had however done it within in the context of shadowrun where I
took a few real day facts and extrapolated them into the future.
Recently however two things have happened that have changed my views drastically
on the use of portable phones. The first was one of my lectures, telecomms,
where portable phone technology is one of the areas of study. The second thing
is the following article.
In my second post, I'll discuss what relevance this has to shadowrun, but I
feel that by the time you have finished reading the article you'll see those
relevances failry clearly.
Phill.
From: "M. Hedlund" <hedlund@******.com>
Subject: FBI Digital Telephony Proposal and PCS mobile phone networks
This article elaborates on part of the EFF statement issued last
week concerning the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony wiretap bill. The EFF
condemned the bill, which enlarges law enforcement powers of surveillance,
granted by wiretap laws, by adding tracking ability. Addressed herein is point
two of the EFF statement, concerning the surveillance of mobile communica-
tors, such as cellular phones, Personal Communications Services (PCS) and
laptop computers. PCS mobile phones create severe privacy risks for future
phone users, especially under the FBI's proposal; and these risks strongly
support the EFF's position.
The FBI asserts that their proposal adapts existing wiretap laws to
account for emerging communications technologies. Wiretap laws have not
adequately covered mobile communications, and the FBI is correct to assume
that some revisions will be necessary to adequately balance law enforcement
needs with the privacy rights of mobile phone users. Their proposed
revisions, however, do not simply provide for wiretap; instead, the FBI seeks
to expand wiretap laws, allowing law enforcement officers to track the
signalling information of mobile communications users.
The EFF believes that the FBI proposal would create an enormous hole
in the privacy rights of individuals suspected of crimes. Their statement
notes:
It is conceivable that law enforcement could
use the signalling information to identify the
location of a target.....This provision takes a
major step beyond current law in that it allows
for a tap and/or trace on a *person*, as opposed
to mere surveillance of a phone line.
This fear is completely realistic. It is not simply "conceivable"
that the FBI's proposal would allow law enforcement to surveil the location of
a target -- positioning technology is a planned part of PCS networks, one of
the technological advances anticipated by the proposal. Similar positioning
technology is planned for cellular phones, as well.
PCS advances cellular phone technology by integrating mobile
communications with other phone networks, and by expanding the services and
quality mobile phones can offer. Most PCS proposals involve three forms of
mobility: terminal mobility, the ability to make and receive calls at any
location, and the ability of the phone network to track the location of the
mobile phone; personal mobility, the ability of the user to be reachable by a
single phone number at all times; and service mobility, the ability of the
user to access CLASS(sm)-like features, such as Call Waiting and Caller ID,
from any phone they use.
The FBI proposal requires phone companies, when presented with a
wiretap order, to transmit the content and the signalling, or "call setup
information," from the tapped phone to law enforcement officers. With a
wireline phone, such as a residence phone line, call setup information would
comprise only the originating and dialled phone numbers, as well as billing
information (such as the residence address) for the call. Because of the
wireless aspect of PCS, however, call setup information for a PCS phone
includes very detailed information on the location and movement of the caller.
PCS mobile phones will connect with the phone network via
"microcells," or very small receivers similar to those used for cellular
phones. While a cellular network uses cells with up to an 8 to 10 mile
radius, PCS networks will use microcells located on every street corner and in
every building. The call setup information for a PCS call would include the
microcell identifier -- a very specific means of locating the user. An order
for a PCS wiretap would allow law enforcement officers to receive a detailed,
verifiable, continuous record of the location and movement of a mobile phone
user.
These phones are also likely to "feature" automatic registration:
whenever the PCS mobile phone is on (in use or able to receive calls), it will
automatically register itself with the nearest microcell. Law enforcement
agencies, able to track this registration, would have the equivalent of an
automatic, free, instantaneous, and undetectable global positioning locator
for anyone suspected of a crime.
PCS tries to improve on cellular phone privacy and security by
incorporating cryptographic techniques. Encryption could not only create a
secure phone conversation, but could also (coupled with use of a PIN number)
insure that only a valid subscriber could make calls on a particular phone,
preventing fraudulent calls on stolen phones. An additional phone-to-network
authentication could prevent fraudulent calling through a "masquerade" phone
designed to simulate a user's registration.
But the FBI proposal would require that such encryption be defeatable
in wiretap circumstances. As the proposal stands, this form of weak
encryption is distinguishable from the Clipper Chip because the phone
companies, not a key escrow arrangement, enable law enforcement access; but it
is entirely possible that the Clipper Chip could be used as the encrypting
device. In either circumstance, PCS encryption could be compromised by
careless or malicious law enforcement officials. Perhaps it is time for Phil
Zimmerman and ViaCrypt to begin work on PGPCS -- and let us all hope we are so
lucky.
The cellular phone market is tremendous, and analysts believe that the
PCS market, incorporating both voice and data communications, will be even
larger. Coupled with the FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, PCS raises many
privacy and security risks, making the EFF's condemnation of the FBI proposal
all the more appropriate.
CLASS is a service mark of Bell Communications Research (Bellcore).
For more information:
* Bellcore Special Report SR-INS-002301, "Feature Description and
Functional Analysis of Personal Communications Services (PCS)
Capabilities," Issue 1, April 1992. Order from Bellcore, (800)
521-CORE (2673), $55.00.
* GAO report GAO/OSI-94-2, "Communications Privacy: Federal Policy
and Actions," November 1993. Anonymous FTP to cu.nih.gov, in the
directory "gao-reports".
* EFF documents, available via anonymous FTP or gopher:
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony
[*The New York Times* today has a front-page article by John Markoff,
entitled "Price of Technology May Be Privacy". I first saw a version of
it in today's *San Francisco Chronicle*, although as seems typical of the
Chron they truncated it after 11 of its 34 paragraphs. At least they
mentioned Markoff this time, which they frequently do not do! PGN]
--
Phillip Steele - Email address P.C.Steele@***.ac.uk | Fighting against
Department Of Electrical & Electronic Engineering | Political Correctness !
University Of Newcastle Upon Tyne, England |
Land of the mad Geordies | The Powerhouse
