| From: | Tzeentch tzeentch666@*********.net |
|---|---|
| Subject: | Intelligence Methods Part 2: Classifications and Clearance [FREAKIN LONG!] |
| Date: | Wed, 2 Aug 2000 12:36:59 -0700 |
bit more generic then it was in the source material. I have some info on the
Russian Federations classification levels and will have that info in another
post. This information is purely informative and I won't be covering how to
make realistic looking classified documents in this section. For full info
on properly marking documents check out the biblio at the end. This text
would be HUGE if I reprinted that. Also this only really covers the DoD
classification scheme (and thus the most common). The DOE also uses its own
funky ass classification methods I'll discuss later.
Note for DG Owners: The information in DG is somewhat outdated, and in some
cases is just plain incorrect. This information comes directly from the
government documentation and takes precendence. Just FYI. If you see
incorrect information on here let me know, this iformation was as current as
I could make it, some of the orders (especially ones restructing the SCI
categories) are VERY recent (Oct 99).
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Collected intelligence information, either in it's "raw" state or after
production of a finished intelligence product, must be provided to a wide
variety of "consumers" - those who use intelligence material in the course
of their work. At the same time much of the information needs to be
protected since its disclosure may reveal the intelligence methods used for
its collection and the use of countermeasures and precautions that would
prevent the collection of similar information in the future. In addition,
information is often supplied through information sharing arrangements with
other governments and organizations that necessitate the establishment of
guidelines for the classification, distribution, and access to intelligence
information.
1.0 CLEARANCES
A Security Clearance is a determination that a person is eligible for access
to classified information. Need-to-know is a determination made by a
possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient, in the
interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, or
knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to
accomplish lawful and authorized government purposes.
Anyone being considered for access to Confidential or Secret clearance must
submit to an Background Investigation (BI) by the Defense Security Service
(DSS). Those who are candidates for Top Secret or SCI clearance must submit
to an Single Scope Background Investigation (SBI). Being read into SCI/SAP
programs often involves polygraph testing and additional background checks.
Contractors and consultants typically have their background investigation
conducted by the General Services Administration (GSA).
Once the investigation is completed the information is forwarded to the
Central Clearance Facility (CCF) for final security determination. Any
derogitory reports and additional investigations are also reviewed by the
CCF to determine clearance maintenance.
All clearances require review and reinvestigation every five years for Top
Secret clearances and 10 years for Secret/Confidential
clearances.Contractors must have
their clearances reviewed every three years.
1.1 INVESTIGATIONS
The following types of investigations vary in scope of investigative effort
to meet the investigative requirements for security determinations.
National Agency Check (NAC)
Each type of personnel security background investigation includes a NAC. The
NAC consists of searches of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
Security/Suitability Investigations Index, Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) Identification Division, FBI Headquarters investigative files, Defense
Clearance and Investigations Index, and other sources as necessary to cover
specific areas of a subject's background. When required, credit searches are
conducted in conjunction with a NAC.
Background Investigation (BI)
A personnel security investigation consisting of a NAC, credit search,
personal interviews of subject and sources, written inquiries, and record
searches covering specific areas of the subject's background during the most
recent 5 years.
Single Scope Background Investigation (SBI)
A personnel security investigation consisting of a NAC, independent
certification of date and place of birth directly from appropriate
registration authority, credit search, personal interviews of subject and
sources, written inquiries, and record searches, which cover specific areas
of subject's background during the past 10 years. A NAC will be conducted on
the subject's spouse or cohabitant. Additionally, a NAC will be conducted on
other individuals bound to the subject by affection or obligation who may be
subject to duress by a foreign power. Foreign born immediate family members
will be subjected to an Immigration and Naturalization Service check.
2.0 CLASSIFICATIONS
The most basic means of managing and controlling access to intelligence
information is the classification system, which defines various levels of
sensitivity to information and restricts access to those who have the
appropriate levels of clearance and a need to know.
Simply having a classification does not automatically give access to
information. Access is purely determined by the necessities of performing
their assigned task. The authority for an consumers actual access to
classified materials rests with the organizations chief security manager,
typically referred to as the Special Security Officer (SSO). SSOs can
confirm or deny a consumers access to specific information. This is to
prevent abuse of the clearance system. An consumer with Top Secret access
who works in communications cannot expect to walk into a nuclear weapons lab
by virtue of his clearance alone.
2.1 CLASSIFICATION LEVELS
The current classification system starts with three levels of classification
(Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret), often referred to collectively as
Collateral National Security Information. Layered on top of these three
levels are at least nine additional protection categories. These include
Department of Defense Special Access Programs (DoD SAPS), Department of
Energy Special Access Programs, Director of Central Intelligence Sensitive
Compartmented Information Programs (DCI SCI), and other material controlled
by special access or bigot lists such as the war plans of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the operational files and source information of the CIA
Operations Directorate.
2.1.1 TOP SECRET - Information which if disclosed to unauthorized parties
could be reasonably expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security. Examples of exceptionally grave damage include armed
hostilities; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national
securely; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex
cryptology and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of
sensitive intelligence operations, and the disclosure of scientific or
technological developments vital to national security.
2.1.2 SECRET - Information that if disclosed to unauthorized parties could
be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of
serious damage include disruption of foreign relations significantly
affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or
policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant
military plans or intelligence operations: compromise of significant
military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant
scientific or technological developments relating to national security.
2.1.3 CONFIDENTIAL - Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.
Examples of damage include the compromise of information that indicates
strength of ground, air, and naval forces; disclosure of technical
information used for training, maintenance, and inspection of classified
munitions of war; revelation of performance characteristics, test data,
design. and production data on munitions of war.
2.1.4 UNCLASSIFIED - Unclassified information is any information that need
not be safeguarded against disclosure, but must be safeguarded against
tampering, destruction, or loss due to record value, utility, replacement
cost or susceptibility to fraud, waste, or abuse. There are other types of
information that require application of controls and protective measures for
a variety of reasons. This information is known as "unclassified controlled
information." This include "For Official Use Only" information,
"Sensitive
But Unclassified" (formerly "Limited Official Use") information, "DEA
Sensitive Information," and "DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
Information,"
2.1.4.1 "For Official Use Only (FOUO)" is a designation that is applied to
unclassified information that *may* be exempt from mandatory release to the
public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) if it meets a variety of
stringent requirements. By definition, information must be unclassified in
order to be designated FOUO. If an item of information is declassified, it
can be designated FOUO if it qualifies under one of the restriction
categories. This means that (1) information cannot be classified and FOUO at
the same time, and (2) information that is declassified may be designated
FOUO, but only if it fits into one of the listed exemption categories.
2.1.4.2 Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information is information
originated within the Department of State that warrants a degree of
protection and administrative control and meets the criteria for exemption
from mandatory public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
Before 26 May 1995, this information was designated and marked "Limited
Official Use (LOU)." The LOU designation will no longer be used.
2.1.4.3 DEA Sensitive information is unclassified information that is
originated by the Drug Enforcement Administration and requires protection
against unauthorized disclosure to protect sources and methods of
investigative activity, evidence, and the integrity of pretrial
investigative reports. The Administrator and certain other officials of the
DEA have been authorized to designate information as DEA Sensitive; the
Department of Defense has agreed to implement protective measures for DEA
Sensitive information in its possession.
2.1.4.4 DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (DoD UCNI) is
unclassified information on security measures (including security plans,
procedures and equipment) for the physical protection of DoD Special Nuclear
Material (SNM), equipment, or facilities. Information is Designated DoD UCNI
only when it is determined that its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably
be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of
the public or the common defense and security by increasing significantly
the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the theft,
diversion, or sabotage of DoD SNM, equipment, or facilities. Information may
be designated DoD UCNI by the Heads of the DoD Components and individuals to
whom they have delegated the authority.
3.0 MARKING AND DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
These are warning notices that further restrict access to information or its
dissemination beyond its classification level.Typically only one of the
three levels of classification will bear these markings. Such documents are
marked by the primary classification then any additional handling
instructions, such as "SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON/PROPIN" or
"CONFIDENTIAL/NOCONTRACT".
NOFORN (Special Handling Required - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals)
This information is only cleared for US citizens with the appropriate
clearance and need to know. Foreign nationals may not be given access to the
information. It is applied to information that may compromise relations with
an allied nation or threaten technical collection programs. It is not
authorized for use in conjunction with the "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO" (REL)
control marking.
Intelligence, even if it bears no restrictive control markings, may only be
released in its original form to foreign governments with the permission of
the originator and in accordance with existing nation security directives.
ORCON (Dissemination and Extraction of Information of Information Controlled
By Originator)
This marking may be used only on classified intelligence that clearly
identifies or would reasonably permit ready identification of intelligence
sources or methods that are particularly susceptible to countermeasures that
would nullify or measurably reduce their effectiveness. Access to the
information must be approved and monitored by the originating agency. This
control is typically only applied to Secret and Top Secret material. It is
the most restrictive special handling instruction and is only applied when
other controls would be inadequate.
PROPIN (Caution - Proprietary Information Involved)
This marking is used, with or without a security classification, to identify
information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an express
or implied understanding that the information will be protected as a
proprietary trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or
potential value.
REL<NATION/ORGANIZATION INITIALS> (Authorized for Release To)
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator
has predetermined to be releasable or has been released, through established
foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign countries/
international organization indicated. Examples include RELUK (United
Kingdom), RELROK (Republic of Korea), RELUKCANUKAUS (Canada, UK, and
Australia), RELUNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) and UNNATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization). Can also be noted as "REL TO"
3.1 OUTDATED MARKINGS
The following special control markings are no longer used.
WNINTEL (Warning Notice - Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved)
Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved
Warning Notice- Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
Warning Notice - Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NOCONTRACT
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY
INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY
LIMITED
CONTINUED CONTROL
NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
USIB ONLY
NFIB ONLY
4.0 SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTALIZED INTELLIGENCE (SCI)
SCI intelligence is classic "above Top Secret" information, and is the
subject of endless speculation outside of the intelligence community. SCI
information involves data regarding sophisticated technical intelligence
systems such as those from reconnaissance satellites, aircraft, and
submersibles.
Background investigations for SCI clearance are very stringent, beyond even
that required for a TS clearance. No risk is acceptable for an SCI clearance
and it is possible to hold an TS clearance and be denied SCI access.
Physical security measures for SCI material are also more extreme then for
TS material, requiring that material remain in vaults or SCIFs (SCI
Facilities). Even a Secret SCI document is protected with greater physical
security then a plain TS one.
4.1 SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SI is one of several categories of SCI that deals specifically with
communications or signals intelligence (SIGINT). There used to be various
levels of sensitivity in SI, UMBRA being the most sensitive, SPOKE being
less sensitive, and MORAY being the least sensitive compartment. To express
the sensitivity the level was stamped along with the primary classification.
For example, a document page containing UMBRA SCI information would have
been stamped TOP SECRET UMBRA and SPOKE SCI would be stamped SECRET SPOKE.
This should not imply that having a Secret or Top Secret clearance would
give access to SECRET SPOKE documents however. The consumer must possess the
appropriate SCI clearance and be a part of the appropriate Special Access
Program in order to access the information. It should be noted that UMBRA
information was always Top Secret and SPOKE and MORAY always at least
Secret, with SPOKE being "more secret" then MORAY.
This has recently changed however, and UMBRA, SPOKE, and MORAY are no longer
authorized for use. Instead such documents are classified as SECRET COMINT
or TOP SECRET COMINT.
4.1.1 COMINT
Within the TOP SECRET COMINT category there are further designators for
especially sensitive data. Examples of past and present designations include
DELTA and GAMMA, each of which has a further subclassification denoting
specific operations or methods. Although current designations and their
purpose are (obviosly) not available older ones are illustrative. Typically
these categories, more technically known as Codewords, are often
classified themselves. Code words are selected in such a manner that the
word used does not suggest the nature of its meaning or associated programs.
GAMMA was originally applied to intercepts of Soviet communications, and
later, US antiwar leaders. Some subcategories of GAMMA included GABE, GANT,
GILT, GOAT, GUPY, GYRO and GOUT. GAMMA GUPY referred to interception of
radiotelephone calls by Soviet officials as they were driven around Moscow
and GAMMA GOUT referred to interception of South Vietnamese government
communications.
Thus an older document may bear the classification TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA
GILT.
DELTA referred to intercepts of Soviet military operation information, such
as teh location of submarines and aircraft operations. Categories under
DELTA included DACE, DICE, and DENT.
Other COMINT designators are VRK and ECI.
4.1.2 SOURCE IDENTIFIER
In addition to special compartments within the SCI categories a document may
bear information as to its source. For example, a TOP SECRET COMINT DRUID
document notes the information was derived from third-party intercepts.
Other designations can indicate the specific nations involved: ISHTAR
(Japan), SETEE (Korea), DYNAMO (Denmark), RICHTER (Germany), and DIKTER
(Norway).
4.2 TALENT-KEYHOLE (TK)
TK SCI is the product of overhead collection systems, known as "National
Technical Means", such as satellites and reconnaissance aircraft.
Compartments of TK include RUFF and CHESS. ZARF is no longer a Codeword in
use, TOP SECRET TALENT KEYHOLE ZARF documents are now just TOP SECRET TALENT
KEYHOLE.
RUFF pertains to information produced by imaging satellites. ZARF indicates
SIGINT obtained by satellite. CHESS is imagery obtained from reconnaissance
aircraft.
A typical classification may be TOP SECRET TALENT KEYHOLE or TOP SECRET ZARF
UMBRA for older documents.
4.2.1 SI-TK CLEARANCE
In practice, SI and TK clearances, representing access to the product of
national technical collection methods, are awarded jointly. Hence the term
"SI-TK clearance" is more common then the terms "SI clearance" or
"TK
clearance." SI-TK clearance gives individuals access to the products of the
sensitive systems, not information concerning the systems themselves.
Information about the type of system, location, orbit, or capabilities is
not available simply because the consumer has a SI-TK clearance. Clearances
for such information is granted on a system-by-system basis in what is
called the BYEMAN classification.
4.2.1.1 BYEMAN
BYEMAN contains many compartments, each one pertaining to a specific system
or process. SIGINT satellites have BYMAN compartments named RHYOLITE,
AQUACADE, CHALET, VORTEX, JUMPSEAT, and MAGNUM. Imaging satellites fall
under the KENNAN, LACROSSE, GAMBIT, HEXAGON, and CORONA compartments. If the
BYEMAN codeword is discovered (typically through leaks to the press) it will
be changed. Thus the list given above may or may not be codewords still in
use.
4.3 OTHER SCI CATEGORIES
There are many other SCI categories, over 100 at last count. Examples
include the NSAs VER, The Navy's SNCP (Special Navy Control Program) and M
(MEDITATE) programs.
5.0 SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS
Special Access Programs are created to control access, distribution, and
protection of particularly sensitive information. Each SAP is given a
"nickname" which consists of two unassociated, unclassified words that are
used to reference the project. An example would be BLUE BOOK, ECHO MIRAGE,
or SENIOR ICE. Individuals who gain access to a SAP must be "read-on" to the
project, where they are briefed, sign various documents, and are often given
polygraph tests or further background checks.
Material from SAPs are often given caveats that are even more restrictive
then ORCON. A TOP SECRET/ECHO MIRAGE/ORCON document may have restrictions
above and beyond even normal ORCON control.
More to follow: In the meantime reference:
http://www.dss.mil/isec/marking/
http://members.macconnect.com/users/q/quellish/Aurora/Aurora.html
http://www.dss.mil/seclib/index.htm
http://www.c3i.osd.mil/other/reg52001.html#chap5
http://www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/IN/ins/roxad1599.htm
Kenneth
